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THIS IS A PRE-PUBLICATION DRAFT. NOT TO BE QUOTED WITHOUT 
PERMISSION FROM THE AUTHOR 
 
Debunking and the psychology of error: a historical analysis of psychological 
matters 
 
PETER LAMONT 
University of Edinburgh, UK 
 
The psychology of the paranormal has always reflected wider themes about the nature and 
status of psychology. This paper, in examining these themes, seeks to show how qualitative 
research in the history of psychology can contribute to the understanding of psychological 
topics, ones that have fundamental relevance to the discipline of psychology as a whole. The 
paper examines the construction of psychological expertise by analysing criticisms of 
unorthodox areas of psychological knowledge. It shows how psychological scientists have 
long deployed certain rhetorical strategies, and that these have been designed not only to 
reject certain claims but also to construct both their opponents as unscientific and, in the 
process, themselves as scientific. Furthermore, through the construction and deployment of a 
psychology of error, critics have warranted both the need and value of psychological 
explanations for such beliefs and, in the process, constructed the superiority of scientific 
expertise over public views about psychological matters.  
 
Keywords: history of psychology; discursive psychology; parapsychology; 
debunking; psychology of error; paranormal belief. 
 
Introduction 
 
While most psychologists recognise the worth of understanding past psychological 
research, it can also be argued that history is essential to psychological understanding 
(e.g. Graumann & Gergen, 1996; Richards, 2002; Smith, 2008). The need for 
historical knowledge within psychology can be seen as following from the reflexive 
nature of psychological knowledge, which is the product of people (because 
psychologists are people too) who think and behave within a wider social context, and 
whose knowledge is the result of thinking and behaving in a particular way that is 
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shaped by that context. Because psychological knowledge, in turn, also shapes how 
we think and behave (both as psychologists and people), we are constantly in the 
business of recreating over time both our understanding of ourselves (Psychology) 
and what we are as thinking and behaving beings (its subject matter). Thus, only 
through history can we understand how psychological knowledge has come to be 
what it is, and how it has shaped what we are. 
 
However, if the history of psychology is to be a part of psychological research, rather 
than a related but separate area of enquiry that provides a useful, but ultimately 
unnecessary, historical background to contemporary (‘real’) psychological research, 
history needs to contribute directly to psychological as well as historical knowledge. 
To do this in practice, psychological topics need to be examined via methods that are 
available to psychologists, and which can be employed in the study of historical 
sources. Discourse analysis offers one practical solution to the problem of method 
(Lamont, 2007a). This paper seeks to address the problem of topic, by using discourse 
analysis to examine a topic of not only historical but also psychological relevance: the 
role of belief, as a discursive social phenomenon, in the construction of psychological 
expertise. 
 
It is, after all, essential to the existence of the discipline of psychology that it is 
recognised as the most reliable source of psychological knowledge, i.e. superior to the 
claims of others who claim expertise on psychological matters and to the 
understanding of the wider public who also tend to have views about such things. 
Thus, for example, the argument is invariably made in introductory psychology texts 
that psychology is a science and, therefore, more reliable than unscientific theories 
and commonsense. What counts as science is, of course, a matter of consensus at any 
given time, and so there has been an ongoing attempt by psychologists to construct 
such a consensus, not only among psychologists and scientists but also among the 
public, who need to realise the limits of their own lay expertise. How the boundaries 
of scientific knowledge and expertise have been negotiated has been a significant 
theme in the history of psychology (e.g. Bunn et al., 2001; Coon, 1992; Derksen, 
1997; Gieryn, 1983; Lamont, 2007a; Wolframm, 2006), and is a matter of 
fundamental importance to understanding the history of the discipline. 
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However, this is not only a question of social or historical context. It is in itself a 
psychological topic, one that might be considered in terms of persuasion or belief. 
Thus, to examine how psychologists have constructed, and continue to construct, the 
scientificity of their discipline, need not be viewed as an inherently critical approach. 
It might be seen as nothing more than a simple recognition that psychologists are also 
people. In the interests of warranting the worth of their discipline, they have sought to 
persuade others that what they do is science, that what others do is not, and that this 
distinction provides them with greater authority to pronounce upon psychological 
topics. In doing so, as we shall see, they have deployed psychological categories in 
order to persuade others. This, then, is a matter of discursive social psychology (cf. 
Edwards, 1997; Potter, 1996) that has fundamental relevance to the discipline of 
Psychology. It is also one that stresses the need for historical understanding, as history 
allows us to examine psychological discourse over time, and to consider the 
significance of continuity and change. And, as we shall see, while changes in 
psychological categories may seem of more obvious significance (e.g. Danziger, 
1997; Smith, 2005), there are also rhetorical continuities that are relevant to 
psychological understanding. 
 
Indeed, what I hope to show is that psychological scientists (i.e. scientists with an 
interest in psychological matters, including those prior to the emergence of academic 
psychology) have long deployed certain discursive strategies in ways designed to 
achieve very similar ends. In doing so, I wish to show how historical analysis can 
address matters of contemporary psychological interest, by showing how 
psychological scientists have constructed themselves as authoritative in relation to 
both rivals and the wider public, and how they have in the process regularly deployed 
a psychology of error (in particular, of false belief). In order to make the case that 
there have been continuities in the form this has taken, the extracts analysed below are 
taken from a wide range of periods and contexts. This is not to suggest for a moment 
that the form of discourse is not shaped by the particular context in which it occurs; 
rather, it is to focus on those similarities in discourse that have oriented towards very 
similar matters of context, albeit at different periods of history. After all, while the 
extracts that follow appeared in quite different historical contexts, all of them 
addressed a similar rhetorical context, one in which rival claims about psychological 
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matters were in dispute. And, despite differences in time and place, these disputes 
were similar in certain key respects. 
 
First, the dispute was always ostensibly about the reality or not of certain 
‘unexplained facts’. Proponents argued that there were observed facts that could not 
be explained by current scientific knowledge, and that these were facts despite the 
lack of a scientific explanation. Critics argued that there were no unexplained facts, 
that the observation was inadequate and that, therefore, existing theories (relating to 
deception and self-deception) were adequate to explain what had really happened. 
Disputes about unorthodox phenomena, so far as they dispute the reality of the 
phenomena, have invariably taken this form. Second, however, in disputing the facts, 
the discussants also disputed matters of psychological expertise and authority. Indeed, 
this was unavoidable, because these disputes rapidly became disputes over perception 
and belief. Proponents argued that they were competent observers, and denied 
accusations that they were driven by prior beliefs or by a desire to believe. 
Conversely, critics claimed superior competence in observation as they themselves 
denied accusations of being driven either by prior beliefs or by a refusal to believe. 
Finally, these disputes over the facts were bound up with disputes not only over 
individual expertise but also over wider issues relating to science and society. 
Proponents argued that such facts, though unexplained, were nevertheless compatible 
with science, and that knowledge of them was beneficial for society. Critics, as they 
rejected the facts, argued that they were incompatible with science, and that beliefs in 
them were detrimental for society (Lamont, 2008). These consistent patterns of 
argumentation, though they have been deployed in particular ways at particular times, 
suggest an ongoing rhetorical context within which one might examine the role of 
belief, as a discursive social phenomenon, in the construction of psychological 
expertise over time. 
 
 
Data and methods 
 
The data used in this analysis are drawn from a range of publications by those I have 
termed psychological scientists, namely, John Forbes, William Benjamin Carpenter, 
Joseph Jastrow, E. G. Boring, and James Alcock. Some individual background details 
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will be given prior to the relevant extracts, but the key point is that, whatever 
differences might separate the individuals themselves, all of the extracts below come 
from texts that shared at least three features. First, they all explicitly argued against 
the reality of phenomena that were generally viewed, by both proponents and critics, 
as unexplained by contemporary scientific knowledge. Second, they were all 
explicitly aimed at a non-specialist audience. Third, they are all well known texts in 
the history of debunking – indeed, their significance is evident from the fact that 
earlier texts are cited by subsequent authors (for example, Alcock cites Hansel, 
Hansel cites Jastrow, Jastrow cites Carpenter and Carpenter cites Forbes). 
 
The extracts were chosen as examples of more common themes that recur throughout 
such publications. The form of discourse analysis resembles that used previously with 
naturally occurring written texts (e.g. Macmillan & Edwards, 1999; Wallwork & 
Dixon, 2004; Lamont, 2007a), in that it focuses primarily on rhetorical strategy. In 
this case, the specific focus was on how authors engaged in the debunking of the 
reality of certain phenomena by making use of a discourse of expertise and belief. For 
reasons of space, the analysis will be restricted to the core argument, which is 
concerned with the presence of certain themes, and some of the extracts are slightly 
abridged. 
 
 
Analysis 
 
The first extract comes from a book entitled Illustrations of Modern Mesmerism from 
Personal Investigation, written by John Forbes in 1845. Forbes was editor of the 
British and Foreign Medical Review, the most widely read medical journal in Britain 
at the time, and a prominent debunker of mesmerism. Though a medic by profession, 
his criticisms of mesmerism, not surprisingly, engaged in psychological discourse, 
and his book was regularly cited by later sceptics. In the preface, he explained the 
purpose of his Illustrations: 
 
‘If received simply as specimens or illustrations of the sort of things which mesmeric 
professors daily hold forth to the world, and which the world receives, as marvels of 
the highest order and as truths admitting of no question, they must surely give rise to 
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reflections that may lead to some beneficial results. … If the professors do not 
condescend to supply the public with evidence of a more satisfactory kind, the public 
must cease to be satisfied with the evidence they do supply … If they refuse to adopt 
the rigid system of observation required in the sciences, and repudiate all the ordinary 
rules of induction and rational inference deemed essential to establish facts on other 
departments of knowledge, they have no right to quarrel with those who persist in 
disbelieving [things] which, for the most part, have no other evidence in their favour 
than the bare assertions of ignorant, interested and, it may be, very unprincipled 
persons … It is also hoped that the perusal of the exposures contained in this little 
book, may teach a useful lesson to those numerous unscientific persons, who are 
accustomed to attend mesmeric exhibitions … Such persons, it is believed, must now 
feel convinced that no reliance whatever is to be placed on the results presented at 
such exhibitions, as evidencing the truth and powers of mesmerism. As these results 
are witnessed by the ordinary visitor, it is quite impossible to discriminate the true 
from the false (Forbes, 1845: vi-ix). 
 
These extracts from the preface, which ostensibly explain the purpose of the book, 
also reveal a number of discursive themes. First, the author presents the book as an 
attempt to show that the facts of mesmerism are false: the evidence is less than 
‘satisfactory’; the rules ‘deemed essential to establish facts’ have been repudiated; and 
the reader should place ‘no reliance’ upon them. Second, in doing so, he presents 
mesmerists as lacking basic scientific expertise: they are quacks (‘professors’, the 
term then having been used regularly to refer to itinerant lecturers with no formal 
qualifications); they do not use the ‘rigid system of observation required in the 
sciences’; they are uninformed (‘ignorant) and biased (‘interested’). Third, in his 
rejection of both the facts of mesmerism and the expertise of mesmerists, the author 
presents himself as scientific: as one who can assess whether evidence is 
‘satisfactory’, can recognise whether scientific procedures have been employed, and 
can ‘teach a lesson’ to ‘unscientific persons’. Fourth, the author constructs his own 
expertise over not only the mesmerists but also the public: who receive such facts ‘as 
marvels of the highest order and as truths admitting of no question’; and who, as 
‘ordinary’ people, cannot ‘discriminate the true from the false’. Thus, as he constructs 
boundaries between the true and the false, he also does so between his own scientific 
expertise and that of not only mesmerists but also the public. 
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It is also notable that the false beliefs of the public in mesmerism are attributed not 
only to the mesmerists but also to the limits of ordinary thinking and observation: to 
the gullibility of the world (which accepts marvels without question) and to the 
unreliable observation of the ‘ordinary’ witness. Furthermore, the challenging of such 
beliefs is presented as having wider social and moral value: they are based on 
evidence presented by those who are not only ‘ignorant’ and ‘interested’ but also ‘it 
may be, very unprincipled’; and more critical reflection is described as being ‘useful’ 
and liable to produce ‘beneficial results’. Thus, the author rejects the phenomena in 
question by constructing a psychology of error that warrants not only the superiority 
of his own scientific expertise over that of mesmerists and the public, but also its 
deployment as necessary and valuable. As we shall see, all of these themes recur in 
subsequent debunking discourse. 
 
Forbes’ debunking of mesmerism appeared shortly before the advent of Modern 
Spiritualism, after which some scientists came to take an interest in the phenomena of 
the séance room. One of the most important was, William Crookes, a well-known 
chemist and Fellow of the Royal Society (and later its President), who famously 
tested the medium, D. D. Home, and came to the conclusion he had discovered a new 
‘psychic force’. One of the witnesses was William Huggins, vice-President of the 
Royal Society. Crookes’ experiments were published in the Quarterly Journal of 
Science in 1871, a journal he himself edited, along with a supporting letter from 
Huggins, and the rhetoric of his articles was significant (Lamont, 2004; Luckhurst, 
2001; Noakes, 2004). Indeed, discourse analysis of Crookes’ articles (Lamont, 2007a) 
has shown how, by constructing a version of science that made relevant the 
importance of accurate observation and the absence of preconceptions about what is 
possible, Crookes presented himself as an ideal scientist who was both an expert 
observer (in contrast with both spiritualists and the public), and an open-minded 
thinker (in contrast with those scientists who refused to enquire into the subject). By 
presenting spiritualist beliefs as wrong and harmful, Crookes constructed the 
scientific study of spiritualism as necessary and valuable. 
 
However, while Crookes was in the business of warranting the reality of his new 
psychic force in a scientific forum, his key critic, William Benjamin Carpenter, 
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responded in a more public arena. Carpenter was a well-known psycho-physiologist, a 
Fellow of the Royal Society and winner of its gold medal. He had been a critic of 
mesmerism, had proposed a theory of ‘ideo-motor action’ to explain table-turning at 
séances in 1852, and had become the most prominent scientific critic of spiritualism 
in mid-Victorian Britain. His response to Crookes, which appeared in the Quarterly 
Review in 1871, did not question Crookes’ claim that the phenomena of spiritualism 
were worthy of scientific investigation, accepting that science should be based on a 
lack of preconceptions. Rather, he rejected the charge of narrow-mindedness, noting 
that ‘it was only after [repeated failure] that we, and our scientific friends associated 
with us, abandoned the pursuit, as involving a waste of time that might be profitably 
employed upon worthier objects of investigation’. Neither, of course, did he 
undermine the importance of scientific expertise. Rather, he distinguished between 
general and specialist scientific expertise, claiming that:  
 
‘a man may have acquired a high reputation in one department of science, and yet be 
utterly untrustworthy in regard to another. This is what not merely the general public, 
but men who claim to guide its judgements, seem unable to understand. Any 
‘scientific man’ is properly supposed to be a competent authority upon obscure 
questions, for the elucidation of which are required discrimination and acute 
discernment of the sources of fallacy, which can only be gained by a long course of 
experience, based on special knowledge, particularly when the enquiry is psychical, 
rather than physical, and involves a knowledge of the modes in which the Mind of the 
observer is liable to be misled either by himself or by the arts of an intentional 
deceiver … there are moral sources of error, of which Dr Huggins, with his simple 
trustingness, would never dream, and that one of the most potent of these is a 
proclivity to believe in the reality of spiritual communications, which places those 
who are not constantly on their guard against its influence under the two fold danger 
of deception – alike from within and from without.’ [original italics] (Carpenter, 1871: 
340-342). 
 
In this passage, Carpenter engages in similar rhetorical strategies to those used by 
Forbes. First, he warrants his rejection of spiritualist phenomena by presenting 
scientific proponents as lacking proper scientific expertise: he distinguishes between 
expertise in ‘one department’ and ‘another’; argues that competence in this area 
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requires ‘special knowledge’; and presents such competence as requiring knowledge 
about sources of error of which Huggins ‘would never dream’. Second, in doing so, 
he presents himself as possessing such expertise: as one who is aware of such sources 
of error, who can publicly remark upon Huggins’ ignorance of these, and who knows 
of the dangers of the ‘proclivity to believe’. Third, he presents his own expertise as 
superior not only to scientific proponents but also the public, who are ‘unable to 
understand’ such distinctions, whose minds are ‘liable to be misled’, and who, 
without ‘a long course of experience based on special knowledge’, are not ‘competent 
authorities’. Thus, as above, in constructing boundaries between the true and the false, 
he also does so between his own scientific expertise and that of his opponents and the 
public. Furthermore, his rejection of the phenomena is also bound up with a 
psychology of error in which beliefs in spiritual phenomena are not only wrong (being 
based on sources of fallacy – indeed, a tendency to believe is itself a source of error) 
but also a ‘moral’ issue and a ‘danger’ against which one must be constantly ‘on their 
guard’. Thus, as above, in constructing his own scientific expertise in such matters as 
superior to that of his opponents and the public, Carpenter warrants its deployment as 
necessary and valuable. 
 
It is worth noting that Carpenter went on to publish a number of articles on the 
psychology of belief (Carpenter, 1873, 1876, 1877), in which these themes recurred, 
and in which they were spelt out more explicitly. In doing so, of course, his 
descriptions of what counted as proper scientific expertise, of the causes of belief and 
its implications, and of the need and value of a psychology of belief, were bound up 
with wider themes within contemporary mid-Victorian discourse about the nature of 
scientific and religious evidence, which had been prompted by Biblical criticism and 
Darwinism, and had led to a growing distinction between external (scientific) 
evidence and the internal evidence of revelation (Cerullo, 1982; Lamont, 2004; 
Oppenheim, 1985). However, we are concerned here with continuities in rhetorical 
strategies over time, rather than with differences between different historical contexts. 
As noted above, while the social context within which these arguments took place 
clearly changed significantly over time, the rhetorical context was similar in that it 
remained that of a psychological scientist engaging in the debunking of ‘unexplained 
facts’ within the public arena.  
 
 10 
Such was also the case with Joseph Jastrow, the first American to obtain a PhD in 
Psychology, who went on to found one of the earliest Psychology departments in the 
United States, at the University of Wisconsin in 1888. He was one of the most 
prominent critics of spiritualism and psychical research in late nineteenth century 
America, writing several articles on these topics, many of which were aimed at a 
general rather than a scientific audience. The extract below comes from a brief article 
he published in Popular Science Monthly entitled ‘The Psychology of Spiritualism’:  
 
‘it is likely that the marvels of spiritualism will be, by believers in them, incorrectly 
and insufficiently reported. The first reason is to be found in the mental condition of 
the observer; if he be excited or deeply moved, his account can not but be affected, 
and essential details distorted … The fact that scientific examination everywhere 
reveals deception makes it extremely probable that, when exposure has not taken 
place, it is because there was no scientific examination … Let him understand that 
under the shelter of spiritualism men and women in all our large cities are daily and 
hourly preying upon the credulity of simple-minded folk, and obtaining money by 
means for which the law provides the jail’ (Jastrow, 1889: 730-732). 
 
As we can see, Jastrow rejects the phenomena of spiritualism as the product of 
deception and self-deception, and the reported evidence as the result of incorrect and 
insufficient reporting. In doing so, he presents those who fail to detect this as being 
unable to conduct a ‘scientific examination’, and himself as one who not only 
recognises a proper scientific examination but also understands the psychological 
reasons for beliefs in such phenomena.  His expertise is presented as superior not only 
to those unqualified to conduct a scientific examination but also more generally to 
‘simple-minded folk’ in ‘all our large cities’. His rejection of the phenomena is also 
bound up with a psychology of error in which such beliefs are not only wrong (based 
on ‘essential details’ being ‘distorted’) but are themselves the result of a ‘mental 
condition’ that caused such distortion. Such beliefs are also presented as a moral issue 
in which the credulity of the public is ‘preyed upon’ by those who are in the business 
of ‘obtaining money’ by illegal means. Thus, Jastrow, as others before him, rejects the 
reality of the phenomena by constructing not only the unscientific status of 
proponents of such phenomena but also his own scientific expertise over them and the 
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wider public, and warrants the need and value of his own psychological expertise by 
presenting such beliefs as both wrong and harmful. 
 
The fourth example is E. G. Boring, the well-known historian of psychology, and 
director of the psychological laboratory at Harvard from 1924 to 1949. In addition to 
other countless publications, most notably his History of Experimental Psychology 
(1929), Boring wrote the introduction to C. E. M. Hansel’s ESP: A Scientific 
Evaluation (1966), a well-known critique of parapsychology’s claims about the reality 
of psi. In that introduction, Boring wrote: 
 
‘there are insidious logical weaknesses when concepts of probability are applied to 
the validation of ESP. This introduction is, however, not the place to discuss the 
details of this complex problem; yet no harm can have been done in exhibiting the 
rather special dissonance to which some keen thinkers adhere without realising how 
insecure is the support these elaborate statistics and gigantic probabilities in 
parapsychology afford *  
* There is an extensive literature on the application of the theory of probabilities to 
empirical data, and the reader can enter it by way of the studies cited (Boring, 1966: 
xx). 
 
In this brief extract, Boring rejects the validity of ESP as a claim based on ‘logical 
weaknesses’ and insecurely supported statistics. In doing so, he presents 
parapsychologists as lacking appropriate scientific expertise, being guilty of such 
logical weaknesses in their application of concepts of probability, and not realising 
how insecure their evidence is. At the same time, the author constructs himself as 
possessing the appropriate scientific expertise, being one who recognises such 
weaknesses and insecure evidence, and who is knowledgeable about ‘the details of 
this complex problem’. His expertise is constructed as superior not only to 
parapsychologists but also to ‘the reader’, who can ‘enter’ the ‘extensive literature’ by 
way of studies the author has provided. This rejection of ESP is also bound up with a 
psychology of error, in which believers exhibit ‘special dissonance’ to which they 
‘adhere without realising’ the weakness of their case. Such thinking is not only wrong 
but ‘insidious’, while exhibiting such flaws in thinking can do ‘no harm’. Thus, in his 
rejection of ESP, the author constructs his own expertise over parapsychologists and 
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the lay reader, and warrants the need and value of such expertise by presenting such 
beliefs as wrong and harmful. 
 
The final example comes from James Alcock’s book, Parapsychology: Science or 
Magic? (1980). Alcock has been a prominent critic of parapsychology in recent years, 
and his book has been one of the best-known critiques of the field. In the conclusion, 
he writes: 
 
‘To the extent that existential fears serve to make parapsychology attractive as a kind 
of surrogate faith, paranormal belief will continue to flourish in one form or another. 
Yet, as I pointed out in Chapter 2, I do not believe that this is the only or even the 
major reason for belief in the paranormal. Much of this belief is based either on a 
negative reaction to the mechanistic view of humankind that science seems to 
provide, or conversely, on the view that scientific evidence supports the claims for the 
existence of psi. We can do something about these two factors. Scientists need to 
educate the public about science’ (Alcock, 1980: 195). 
 
Thus, Alcock rejects the claims for the existence of psi by presenting those attracted 
to parapsychology as unscientific people (who are driven by ‘existential fears’ to seek 
‘a surrogate faith’), and himself as someone with proper scientific expertise (who can 
‘point out’ the various reasons for belief, and can explain what scientists can and need 
to do). His expertise is constructed as superior not only to parapsychologists but also 
the public, whose ‘view that scientific evidence supports the claims for the existence 
of psi’ means that they need to be educated about science. His criticisms of 
parapsychology are bound up with a psychology of error in which paranormal belief 
is not only wrong but also based on a ‘negative’ view of science, and is something 
that scientists ‘need’ to do something about, thus warranting the worth of his own 
psychological expertise. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
There is, of course, a significant body of literature on the psychology of belief in 
general, and on paranormal belief in particular (see Irwin, 2009). In the provision of 
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psychological explanations for belief in the paranormal, psychologists may dismiss 
paranormal claims, and they may present themselves as experts on the subject. That 
these themes are compatible is hardly surprising. The argument here is that, in the 
process of rejecting certain claims, psychological scientists have constructed their 
expertise over both proponents and the wider public, and have deployed a psychology 
of erroneous belief in the process. The latter has not been a disinterested attempt to 
understand why people believe in certain phenomena but has itself been part of the 
argument against the reality of the phenomena in which people believe. It has also 
been a way of warranting the need and value of psychological expertise to a non-
specialist audience. In short, debunking has been used as an opportunity to persuade 
others of the importance of psychological knowledge, and the discursive deployment 
of a psychology of erroneous belief has been key to this. 
 
As a historical argument, this offers a quite different interpretation of events from that 
of others. For example, Coon (1992) has argued that early American psychologists, in 
defence of their newly born science, engaged in combat with psychical research, by 
testing psychic claimants and by creating a new area - the psychology of deception 
and belief. Wolframm (2006) has made similar claims about early German 
psychology. However this view fails to consider the following points. First, what 
counted as psychology or psychical research was itself part of the argument. Thus, so 
far as ‘psychologists’ engaged in the testing of psychic claimants, far from combating 
psychical research, they were, by definition, doing psychical research. Second, a 
psychology of deception and belief was neither new (e.g. Carpenter, 1873) nor an 
‘area’ in any meaningful sense. After all, while a few eminent psychologists 
published articles on deception and belief at the end of the century, they appeared 
largely in non-specialist journals and in such an ad hoc fashion that Norman Triplett, 
when he published a doctoral dissertation on the psychology of deception in 1900, 
was not even aware that Joseph Jastrow had published on the topic just a few years 
earlier (Triplett, 1900). Thus, Jastrow’s publications, rather than being part of a new 
area of psychology, are better understood as part of an ongoing discourse of 
debunking, one in which individuals deployed a psychology of belief in ways 
designed to construct the worth of their expertise.   
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A more conventional historical article could have made similar points, perhaps 
stronger claims, and no doubt in a more eloquent narrative form. However, it is hoped 
that by adopting a form closer to that used by discourse analysts, there are certain 
advantages. First, by providing extracts, rather than isolated quotes within a general 
historical narrative, it can be shown more clearly that these distinct but related 
rhetorical moves were intricately bound up together. Second, by providing an open 
analysis of these extracts, it allows the reader to assess the analytical process and, 
therefore, to agree or disagree with the interpretation. Such open analysis, which is 
not employed in a typical historical narrative, thus allows for reader evaluation to act 
as a form of reliability (Potter, 1996). Third, by making the argument in this form, it 
may be more familiar to colleagues within psychology and, it is hoped, more 
convincing as a psychological argument.  
 
In making this psychological argument, one must acknowledge that there is a 
significant difference between using sources from different historical periods and 
drawing upon contemporary data, but it has been argued that, while the historical 
contexts clearly varied, the rhetorical context was similar in those respects most 
relevant to the analysis. In drawing upon a range of historical sources, one might be 
more open to the accusation of ‘cherry-picking’, but those familiar with the historical 
sources relating to disputes over psychic phenomena will know that the rhetoric of 
debunking has shown remarkable consistency over time, and that very similar 
arguments have long been deployed in disputes over unexplained phenomena (e.g. 
Hess, 1993; Lamont, 2008; McLenon, 1984; Wallis, 1979; Wooffitt, 1992; Zingrone, 
unpub’d). For example, what might be called the Galileo argument - ‘they laughed at 
Galileo too’ - was being employed by mesmerists (and refuted by critics) in the 
1840s, and is still being deployed by proponents of controversial claims (and refuted 
by sceptics) to the present day (e.g. ‘Animal Magnetism’, 1838; Sagan, 1979). That 
there has been continuity in the form of argumentation might suggest that subsequent 
generations have simply drawn upon their predecessors. However, that these 
debunking attempts were all designed in a way that constructed expertise and 
deployed a discourse of belief does not mean that later attempts were drawing upon 
earlier ones in their construction and deployment of these categories. Indeed, the form 
in which these strategies were used, and the degree to which they were intricately 
bound up together suggests otherwise. Rather, these debunking attempts can be seen 
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as examples of how psychological categories can be, and have been, discursively 
deployed in ways designed to persuade others of the worth of psychological expertise.  
 
In a broader sense, what this analysis seeks to show is that historical analysis can 
contribute to understanding of psychological matters that relate to the place of 
psychology as a discipline. Whatever the cognitive status of beliefs, the expression of 
belief is a social phenomenon (cf. Edwards, 1997; Potter, 1996), and expressed beliefs 
about the paranormal, like descriptions of the paranormal, are produced in ways that 
are functional within particular social contexts (Lamont, 2007b; Wooffitt, 1992). 
However, a discourse of belief can also be deployed as part of a wider social 
argument that is designed to construct expertise in psychological matters. This 
deployment of psychological expertise can be seen, in turn, as being designed to 
persuade an audience that such beliefs are wrong and harmful, and that certain 
practices (such as attending demonstrations of psychic phenomena, or the scientific 
study of them) are equally so. In this sense, these authors were engaging in the 
deployment of psychological expertise in a way that was designed to change thought 
and behaviour. There is, of course, nothing surprising about this; indeed, it could be 
seen as the main purpose of much of applied psychology. Nevertheless, that 
psychological knowledge not only represents thought and behaviour but also, in 
representing its objects of study, is part of the process through which they change 
over time, is one reason why historical analysis is essential to psychological 
understanding (e.g. Danziger, 1997; Richards, 2002; Smith, 2007). But history is 
about continuity as well as change, and this analysis suggests that there are also 
continuities in how psychological scientists have not merely represented 
psychological phenomena but have discursively constructed and deployed them in 
ways that have been designed to achieve particular social ends. What history offers is 
a way of examining how both continuity and change in the form and function of 
psychological discourse have shaped both the discipline and its subject matter. 
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